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Abstract: This research article addresses the issue of media bias as it played out
on Canada’s three major television networks during coverage of the 2006 fed-
eral election. The data suggest that in spite of critics’ concerns that networks
exhibit political bias, this was not evident. However, a more subtle and systemic
bias was apparent. Front-runners (i.e., parties that polls indicated would do well)
received substantially more coverage than other parties. Conversely, parties that
were perceived as being less successful received less coverage than political
front-runners. In addition, reports about front-runners were placed higher in the
lineup. These empirical findings should be of interest to critics on both the right
and left of the political spectrum who are concerned about the gatekeeping and
agenda-setting functions of the media.
Keywords: Broadcasting; Media/mass media; Television/cable television
Résumé : Cet article de recherche adresse la question de partis pris dans les
médias lors de la couverture des élections fédérales de 2006 effectuée par les
trois chaînes canadiennes principales. Les données obtenues indiquent que,
malgré ce que pensent certains critiques, il n’est pas évident que ces chaînes
avaient des penchants politiques particuliers. Cependant, un penchant
systémique plus subtil est apparent. En effet, les favoris (c’est-à-dire les partis
qui selon les sondages allaient réussir le mieux) ont reçu une couverture plus
approfondie que les autres partis. En revanche, les partis perçus comme étant
moins en avance ont reçu une couverture moindre. Par surcroît, les reportages
sur les favoris passaient sur les ondes avant les autres. Ces données empiriques
devraient intéresser les critiques tant de droite que de gauche qui se soucient des
fonctions d’agenda et de garde-barrière des médias.
Mots clés : Radiodiffusion; Médias/médias de masse; Télévision/câblodistribution
This research article addresses the issue of media bias in Canadian election cov-
erage. Specifically, it explores airtime bias: the allocation of airtime to each party
and its leaders. In a related vein, it addresses lineup bias by examining the place-
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ment of news reports in network lineups. Media bias is both an academic issue
and one that concerns journalists and the public at large.
An opinion poll commissioned by Carleton-Decima shows the majority of
Canadians suspected media bias during the 2006 election (as cited in Waddell
& Dornan, 2006, pp. 249-250). The parties themselves also suspected they were
treated unfairly, specifically when it came to the volume of coverage the media
offered them (Waddell & Dornan, 2006, p. 220). Specifically, the Green party
registered a formal complaint about lack of coverage. Both the Liberals and the
NDP expressed concerns. Even before the campaign began, broadcast journal-
ist turned Conservative political candidate Peter Kent issued a challenge to a
number of journalism school professors involved in media research, inviting
them to explore a perceived media bias favouring the Liberal party. In his let-
ter, Kent wrote, “Is there an inherent Liberal bias in some of our leading news
organizations? . . . I can’t prove my beliefs statistically because no measure-
ment has ever been taken. But a study would certainly shine some much-needed
light on the issue” (Peter Kent, personal communication, September 5, 2005).
What is clear from the research presented in this article is that bias can be
more elusive than the form with which Kent, and other critics, are concerned. A
content analysis suggests that networks are impressively even-handed when it
comes to favouring either those on the left or right of the political spectrum.
However, front-runners, the parties that polls suggest are most likely to win the
election, are given substantially more airtime. As discussed later, in the methodol-
ogy section of this paper, airtime is vital to a candidate. Visual images are the dom-
inant means of communication in any television report. Party leaders and
candidates given large amounts of airtime enjoy a higher recognition factor, which
translates into more votes at the ballot box. In addition to taking up more airtime,
reports about front-runners run highest in the lineup. Although Kent concerns him-
self with a more obvious bias (i.e., networks showing political favouritism), this
article suggests this is not the case. Instead, networks are displaying a more subtle
and systemic bias that helps perpetuate the political status quo by favouring front-
runners regardless of their political stripe.
Why bias matters
The question of bias is relevant only if it can be shown that coverage is influen-
tial, that it can directly affect the outcome of elections. This brings us into the
province of media effects theory and an ongoing debate that has lasted nearly a
century. That debate has focused on a key question: does the media shape public
opinion or merely reflect it?
We know that large numbers of the population are exposed to media during
elections. As Cross (2006) writes, “During elections, a large amount of attention
is focused on the news media, possibly more than at any other time except that of
disasters” (p. 65). Television news is the medium from which most voters receive
their information (Lowry & Shidler, 1998, p. 719). According to Statistics Canada,
91% of Canadians who frequently follow current affairs almost always received
some of their news from television (Keown, 2007). This level of exposure tells us
that, at least theoretically, television has the potential to affect people’s attitudes
and values. But does it?
622 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (4)
Early research into this question suggested that the media was decisive in
shaping political attitudes (White, Oates, & McAllister, 2005). Influenced per-
haps by the surge to power of the Nazis, and their successful manipulation of pub-
lic opinion, the media was seen as immensely powerful and audiences were seen
as “an undifferentiated mass, easily manipulated by the messages they received
from press, radio and particularly television” (White et al., 2005, p. 193). As
empirical research developed, this view was challenged. Berelson (1959) found
that people chose media “congenial to their predispositions” and that those media
were already in line with their “latent attitudes” (p. 3). In other words, audiences
were no longer seen as malleable groups ready to fall under the persuasive power
of clever manipulators. Klapper (1960) went even further and suggested that
media followed public opinion and, in fact, it was the “public that manipulated
the media,” not the reverse (p. 8).
As White et al. (2005) note, more recent approaches have avoided either
extreme, but there is once again recognition that media can be influential. In par-
ticular, the agenda-setting theory supports this view. This theory was introduced
by McCombs and Shaw (1972), who wrote, “In choosing and displaying news,
editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping polit-
ical reality” (p. 176).
More recent studies have measured the extent to which the national media
agenda has correlated with public salience, or the public’s sense of the importance
of issues (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990; Hester & Gibson, 2007; Kiousis, 2003;
Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). Soroka (2002) has explored how agenda-setting
dynamics work in Canada, by tracing the coverage of key public policy issues
ranging from HIV/AIDS to unemployment. Such contemporary research builds
on Cohen’s assertion (1963) that “[t]he press may not be successful much of the
time in telling people what to think but it is stunningly successful in telling its
readers what to think about” (p. 120). In fact, television’s mantra has often been
described as “show don’t tell.” When focusing on the issues alone, the power of
the visual images themselves is often overlooked. Perhaps even more important
than telling people what to think about, television tells people whom to watch.
This has been overlooked in much of the prior research on news and bias. The
visual component is a crucial element of agenda-setting.
In Canada, Jenkins (1999) suggested the role of such airtime was significant.
He quantified how when an insurgent party, the Reform party, received increased
media coverage, its share of voters increased proportionately. Jenkins writes,
“While this change in attention to Reform was critical for Reform’s ability to
mobilize its potential electoral support, it also provides empirical support for the
argument that there is an underlying equilibrium between the amount of coverage
a party receives and its political support” (p. 429). According to Herr (2002), “It
is indeed this free media coverage that candidates rely on to energize, turn out,
and provide information to the undecided voter” (p. 906).
My underlying assumption is that media coverage has at least the potential to
influence the outcome of an election. By measuring volume of coverage and
placement in the news lineup, this study finds its theoretical home in gatekeeping
theory (Donohue, Olien, & Tichenor, 1989; Gieber, 1956; Shoemaker, 1991;
White, 1950). This theory, as applied to newsrooms, explores how news lineups
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are constructed and why some items are rejected while others are aired.
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) offered a useful overview of the many factors that
might influence news content, including the individual characteristics of media
workers; organizational news gathering practices, including professional codes
and agreement about news values; institutional practices and structures, includ-
ing ownership and monopolies; political parties and governments; finally,
assumptions about the larger culture and definitions of social reality shared by the
dominant culture. This research uses gatekeeping as a starting point to look at air-
time and lineup construction. Clearly there are many ways to gatekeep. The usual
definition of gatekeeping is broadened in this article by suggesting that the choice
of visual images themselves constitutes a type of gatekeeping.
The scholarly literature supports the theory that journalists’ personal and
political views might affect coverage, including Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter
(1986) and Barber and Rauhala (2005). Others conclude that the beliefs of such
journalists are irrelevant to content (Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Tuchman,
1978). Folarin (2002) adds other factors, such as the perceived needs and prefer-
ences of audiences. However, all these studies recognize that news reports are
mediated, and that there is the potential for bias within the parameters of news
lineup construction.
Having suggested that bias has the potential to influence results as the ballot
box, it is important to define the term in order to clarify precisely what kind of
bias my research measures. D’Alessio and Allen (2000) offer some useful defini-
tions within their meta-analysis of media bias in presidential elections. They draw
attention to three kinds of bias: gatekeeping bias, the preference for selecting sto-
ries from one party or another; coverage bias, which considers the amount of cov-
erage each party receives; and statement bias, which focuses on the favourability
of coverage media gives one party or another (p. 133).
My quantitative investigation focuses on both gatekeeping and coverage
bias. Specifically, it addresses the biases inherent in allotting airtime and place-
ment in lineups. Gatekeeping decisions and coverage bias affect both areas. By
analyzing such factors as the volume of coverage given to each party and leader,
placement of those stories in the lineup, mentions of parties and leaders, and clips
or sound bites given to party leaders, this study assesses coverage given to each
party and leader on Canada’s three main networks.
The social and political context
To understand the findings, it is essential to understand the social and political
context of this research. To that end, there follows below a brief description of
the political parties involved, the networks, the polls that were predictive of elec-
tion results, and the public’s sense of the coverage.
The parties
The front-runners during the election were the Conservative party and the Liberal
party, the incumbents. The Conservatives ultimately elected 124 members and
the Liberals elected 103 members. In third place, the Bloc Québécois obtained 51
seats. Only voters in the largely French-speaking province of Québec had the
option of voting for this party, which has a platform that includes separation from
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Canada. In fourth place with 29 seats was the New Democratic party (NDP), a
left-of-centre party that tends to favour greater governmental involvement in eco-
nomic and social policy (Elections Canada, 2006).
The networks and the coverage
Canada’s three largest English networks are CTV (the largest private network);
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), which is publicly owned; and
Global Television, also private. Each day, millions of Canadians tune in to one or
all of these networks. Since so many Canadians use these networks as a frame of
reference, how they report the news is essential to the democratic process
(Keown, 2007).
CBC is perceived as attracting left-of-centre viewers. Media critics such as
Barry Cooper (1994) have accused it of supporting a left-wing agenda. CTV and
Global Television are thought to attract right-of-centre viewers. This was con-
firmed during the campaign. A Carleton-Decima poll asked about viewing pref-
erences during the leaders’ debate and found that “CBC debate viewers were
more likely to be on the left of centre while a greater share of CTV and Global
viewers leaned to the right” (Waddell & Dornan, 2006, p. 247).
As for the timing of the network coverage, as Waddell and Dornan (2006)
observe, the campaign occurred during a slow time of year for news outlets,
December and January (p. 229). That meant more extensive election coverage per
week than had been the case in the 2004 Canadian election.
The polls
As usual, polls were used extensively during the campaign. As Matthew
Mendelsohn writes, “A good poll changes the tone of the coverage, positive or
negative” (1993, para. 14). Over the course of the election, polls such as Ipsos-
Reid (Heard, 2006) indicated the Conservatives were gaining over the Liberals.
Networks were conducting their own polls. CTV polls in conjunction with the
Globe and Mail showed a lead for the Liberals in the first week, then a shift dur-
ing week 2. By the last week of coverage, CTV reported the Conservatives had
40% of national support, followed by the Liberals at 27%, the NDP at 16%, the
Bloc at 11%, and the Green party at 6%. The polls, commissioned by the media,
continued to play an important role in the coverage.
Some election observers were concerned about the influence of those polls.
In 2004, seat projection models had overestimated the strength of the
Conservative Party of Canada and predicted a Conservative party minority rather
than the actual Liberal minority. In 2006 the media were more cautious and some
changed their pollsters. CTV and the Globe and Mail changed to Strategic
Counsel, led by Allan Gregg, former chief pollster to the Progressive
Conservative Party. Global Television and the National Post replaced their usual
pollster, COMPASS, with Ipsos-Reid, the country’s largest polling organization.
CBC continued its practice of using Environics Research, which produced in-
depth research for the guidance of senior news staff. However, unlike at Global
and CTV, the results of such polls were not broadcast, with the exception of some
pre-writ and post-writ polling (Marzolini, 2006).
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The public
Finally, it is useful to know that in spite of concerns about media bias, the
Carleton-Decima survey of Canadians found three-quarters of Canadians said the
media had done a good or excellent job covering the campaign (Waddell &
Dornan, 2006). Waddell and Dornan believe one of the reasons the public reac-
tion to coverage was so favourable is that the election ended a minority govern-
ment in which “the antics of all parties and the media coverage of those antics
alienated many Canadians. Non-stop allegations of sleaze and scandal, name-
calling, political manoeuvring, and backstabbing reduced parliamentary proceed-
ings to the level of schoolyard bickering” (p. 251). Since the Conservatives
steered the election in the direction of issues and policy (for much of the election
they released a policy statement a day), the tone of coverage changed.
Measuring airtime and lineup placement
As discussed, the amount of airtime candidates get and the position of reports in
the lineup have the potential to influence voters. With that in mind, the following
questions guided this research:
• What was the amount of time devoted to each party running in the 2006
Canadian federal election, during nightly national news reports on
Canada’s three television networks?
• What was the amount of time devoted to each party leader, as measured
by clips that aired from each leader, during those broadcasts?
• How did parties compare in terms of placement in the lineups of news
reports focusing on each party in the 2006 Canadian federal election?
• How did the smaller political parties fare, as compared to front-runners,
when it came to coverage during national TV newscasts on the three
Canadian networks?
To carry out this research, I recorded national broadcasts from Canada’s three
largest English networks—CBC, CTV, and Global Television—for the crucial
three-week period leading up to the election. This period follows the holidays,
when many people had perhaps disrupted their viewing habits by visiting family
out of town. As Waddell and Dornan (2006) write, even though the campaign was
longer, the Liberals believed January 3 was the start of the “real campaign”
(p. 244). Both the tapes and transcripts for this period were analyzed.
To attain the first set of data, I isolated stories that focused on one party and
calculated both the number of such stories and their average placement in the
newscast lineup. Lineup ranking is important because, as anyone who has worked
in a newsroom knows, a lineup reveals a network’s news priorities clearly. In
general, the more important a story, or the more likely it is to engage an audi-
ence, the higher it is usually placed in the news lineup. In addition, more viewers
tend to be watching at the beginning of a broadcast than at the end, so it is advan-
tageous to a party to be higher in that lineup.
To attain the second set of data, I calculated the number of times leaders and
parties were mentioned in all stories over the course of an entire newscast. This is
important, for the research suggests that familiarity with a party affects decisions
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at the polls (Jenkins, 1999). Finally, I calculated the number of clips, also known
as sound bites, given to party leaders and what percentage of total time for clips
this represented. This is also important, for sound bites give leaders the opportu-
nity of speaking to the electorate in a relatively unmediated fashion. These meas-
ures together gave a good overview of the amount of coverage allocated to each
party and leader, and what priority in the lineup the coverage was given.
All newscasts were screened in their entirety. Although many researchers work
from transcripts alone, this can be misleading. As discussed previously, pictures are
the dominant means of communication in television, and neglecting to screen those
pictures can result in misleading conclusions. Fox, Angelini, and Goble (2005)
make it clear that it is important to analyze pictures and audio, not just transcripts,
as the pictures may tell a different story from the written scripts. Although, as dis-
cussed above, I embarked on a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis, I do
include a brief discussion of the contents of the coverage in a later section.
A different kind of bias
Political bias is generally understood as being synonymous with political
favouritism. In this understanding of bias, different media organizations are
biased according to a perceived ideological difference that is reflected in their
content. My study of the networks suggests such ideological differences are not
reflected in content. However, the systemic or structural bias I am identifying is
more subtle. It underscores how the allocation of time and the location of a story
in the news lineup may make a difference.
The data are discussed below and presented in tabular form where indicated.
The amalgamated tables for the three-week lead-up to the election are presented in
the body of the text. The week-by-week analysis is presented in the appendices.
As can be seen in Table 1, over the three weeks the networks gave similar
amounts of time to coverage of the two front-runners. CBC and Global ran a vir-
tually identical number of stories covering the Liberals and the Conservatives.
CTV averaged only one more Conservative party story per week. Over the lead-
up, Conservative party stories took first place on all three networks’ lineups,
which appeared to parallel the change in that party’s standing in the polls.
The week-by-week data explain this phenomenon (see Appendix A). The per-
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Table 1: Overall party coverage and average ranking in the lineup
Number of stories focusing on each party (and % of coverage that represents)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 15 (32.6) 14 (30.4) 10 (21.7) 6 (13) 1 (2.2)
CTV 14 (33.3) 17 (40.5) 7 (16.7) 3 (7.1) 1 (2.4)
Global 12 (34.3) 13 (37.1) 8 (22.9) 1 (2.9) 1 (2.9)
Average ranking in lineup
CBC 2 1 3 4 5
CTV 2 1 3 4 5
Global 2 1 3 4 5
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
centage of coverage was similar during week 1. In week 2, as polls shifted, story
numbers remained consistent between parties. However, the Conservatives gar-
nered more airtime than Liberals on all three networks. Conservative party stories
also tended to run higher in the lineup than they did the previous week. This trend
continued during week 3; however, the percentage of coverage both front-runners
received became more alike. All networks tended to give the Conservative party
stories somewhat more airtime, especially in the last two weeks of the election as
that party gained popularity with the electorate.
The NDP, as the third party, received less coverage. Stories devoted to it
tended to be shorter, resulting in a smaller percentage of total airtime. However,
it is noteworthy that the number of stories devoted to the NDP was consistent
across networks, especially during weeks 1 and 3. Smaller parties, including the
Bloc and the Green party, received relatively little coverage.
Because mention of both leaders and parties is important during an election,
the second measure calculated the number of times leaders and parties were men-
tioned within all stories within each broadcast. As Table 2 documents, this was
similar, for the most part, on each network, especially when it came to mentions
of the two front-runners. Although CTV mentioned Harper slightly more over the
three weeks, it also mentioned the Liberal party slightly more often.
The week-by-week data show a similar even-handedness (see Appendix B). The
only noteworthy spread occurred on CTV, which mentioned Martin more during
the first week and Harper more during the third week of the campaign. However,
references to the parties themselves were similar in number. In week 3, both
CBC and CTV mentioned Harper more than Martin as a Conservative victory
appeared imminent; however, the discrepancy between party mentions is small.
The NDP leader, Jack Layton, was given fewer mentions across networks and the
Bloc and Green party members fewer still.
The final measure assesses the airtime given to clips from the leaders, as
noted in Table 3, below. Clips, or sound bites, give party leaders an opportunity
to speak directly to constituents. Over the three weeks, all three networks gave a
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Table 2: Overall number of times leaders and parties were mentioned
Number of times leaders mentioned (and % of total)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 61 (32.3) 68 (35.9) 37 (19.6) 21 (11.1) 2 (1.1)
CTV 47 (34.6) 55 (40.4) 23 (16.9) 10 (7.4) 1 (0.7)
Global 32 (37.2) 34 (39.5) 14 (16.3) 5 (5.8) 1 (1.2)
Number of times parties mentioned (and % of total)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green 
Québécois Party
CBC 94 (35.3) 91 (34.2) 52 (19.5) 26 (9.8) 3 (1.1)
CTV 60 (32.9) 58 (31.9) 32 (17.6) 20 (10.9) 12 (6.6)
Global 38 (34.2) 39 (35.1) 17 (15.3) 5 (4.5) 12 (10.8)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
similar amount of airtime to the front-runners. Although CBC ran more
Conservative clips, the percentage of airtime given to each leader is similar. CTV
and Global ran a virtually identical number of Liberal and Conservative clips,
although on CTV the Liberals were given more airtime.
In the first week, CBC and CTV gave more time to Harper’s clips and Global
gave more time to Martin’s (see Appendix C). In the second week, the percent-
ages CBC and CTV allocated to both leaders were equitable. That week, as the
tide turned, Global allocated more time to Harper. In the final week, although
Global and CBC gave Harper slightly more clips than Martin, and CTV favoured
Martin slightly, the amount of time each leader spoke overall is very similar for
all networks.
Partisan clips not coming from party leaders are not indicated on the table but
were similarly equitable. Generally, Conservative clips were offset by Liberal
clips. For example, in the third week, Global ran one partisan clip, not originat-
ing from a party leader, from each of the Conservative, Liberal, and NDP parties.
Again, NDP clips trailed behind Liberal and Conservative clips, and the Bloc and
Green party had little representation. This type of airtime bias suggests that
smaller parties are at a disadvantage in terms of taking their messages to the
Canadian electorate.
Other observations
As for the tone of that coverage, it is difficult to comment on whether coverage
is negative, positive, or neutral. For example, if Martin, the prime minister,
appeared to have made a tactical error during the campaign and a party reported
it, would this be negative coverage or merely responsible journalism? None of
this can be measured empirically.
However, a casual observation of the coverage, which makes no claim to be
anything than an informed viewer’s perspective, yields the following observa-
tions: Global focused on mistakes Martin and his party made, more than did the
other networks. Stories about Stephen Harper focused more on his policies and
continual criticism of the Liberal party than on campaign errors. Most media
observers, such as Waddell and Dornan (2006), believe the Conservatives ran a
better campaign, so this might account for the discrepancy.
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Table 3: Overall number of partisan clips and percentage of total time 
leaders were given for their clips
Number of clips (and % of total time allocated to leaders)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 70 (33.3) 88 (41.9) 35 (16.7) 14 (6.7) 3 (1.4)
CTV 54 (39.7) 53 (39.0) 21 (15.4) 6 (4.4) 2 (1.5)
Global 32 (41.6) 30 (38.9) 13 (16.9) 1 (1.3) 1 (1.3)
Total number of words each leader speaks in clips (and % of total words allocated to leaders)*
CBC 2,079 (37.1) 2,305 (41.1) 822 (14.7) 332 (5.9) 65 (1.2)
CTV 1,177 (45.2) 814 (31.2) 464 (17.8) 104 (4.0) 47 (1.8)
Global 926 (43.4) 908 (42.5) 254 (11.9) 25 (1.2) 23 (1.1)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Other aspects of the coverage were noteworthy: Although Global attempted
to hold interviews with all leaders, the Jack Layton interview never materialized.
In general, NDP stories were brief, including a mention that leader Jack Layton’s
plane broke down and he could not keep to his schedule. While screening, it can
be seen that Global’s Paul Martin and Stephen Harper interviews were conducted
very differently. Martin’s interview was conducted by satellite. Stephen Harper’s
took place in his old neighbourhood, strolling down streets and reminiscing about
his childhood. This may be because of logistical and time considerations the lead-
ers themselves imposed, but the editorial effect is that it was easier for a viewer
to connect with Harper.
For the most part, CTV balanced its coverage between the Liberals and the
Conservatives. Although the NDP was given more airtime toward the end of the
campaign, it was still relatively peripheral. All three leaders—of the Liberals,
Conservatives, and NDP—were interviewed in the same setting in a similar way.
Much of the coverage focused on who was winning and who was ahead in the polls.
CBC’s coverage was slightly different from that of the other two networks.
In general, coverage focused more on policy and analysis than it did on Global
and CTV. Less attention was paid to both the polls and the “horse race” aspect of
the campaigns. Although leaders’ mistakes were reported, such stories were lower
on the lineup than they were at Global, which tended to put such stories higher
up. Stories about Harper often focused on his well-run campaign. Criticism of
Harper often came from clips from Martin. Stories about the NDP were briefer
than those dedicated to the front-runners, but CBC gave more time to such cov-
erage than did the other networks.
In general, all three networks worked hard at fresh approaches. CTV hired
six-year-old Daniel Cook, already a star on his own television series aimed at
young children, as a correspondent. Both CBC and CTV ran segments where
candidates pitched their parties to undecided voters in a “speed-dating” type of
scenario. CBC also used many other unique treatments, such as “Road Trip” seg-
ments in which a reporter accompanied voters to other parts of the country so
they could better understand other voters’ concerns. (A voter from Montreal, for
example, had an eye-opening trip to Alberta.) CBC used comedy segments and a
“Taxi Chat” segment where candidates drove cabs and recorded their encounters
with customers. Other unique treatments included commentary from an initially
anonymous campaign insider and a feature in which parties were given airtime
to produce their own news reports about campaign events that day.
Airtime and lineup bias: Final reflections
Peter Kent’s concern that networks show political favouritism, which he charac-
terized as bias, when covering elections is not borne out by this research. The net-
works presented fair and balanced coverage and held themselves to high
professional standards. However, airtime bias and lineup bias were clearly evident.
Generally, patterns of coverage were similar on all three networks. As the
Conservative party pulled ahead in the polls, it received more coverage. No net-
work overtly favoured one of the front-runners, and no party, Liberal or other-
wise, was given airtime out of proportion to its standing in the polls. This should
be reassuring to critics on both the left and right of the political spectrum.
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The finding might be surprising to those who routinely accuse the media of
political bias. For example, in the first week, CBC, which attracts left-of-centre
viewers according to a Carleton-Decima poll (Waddell & Dornan, 2006), gave
more time to the Conservative leader’s clips, and Global TV, which attracts right-
of-centre viewers, according to the same Carleton-Decima poll, gave more time
to the Liberal leader’s clips.
It is reassuring that Peter Kent’s concerns about Liberal media bias were not
substantiated by the data. However, this research suggests communication schol-
ars might broaden definitions of bias and recognize the less obvious ways in
which bias does in fact occur. Much of the prior research ignores the significance
of both airtime and lineup bias. This is a serious omission. By giving more time
to parties that polls indicate are most likely to form the government and the oppo-
sition, networks unwittingly reinforce the status quo. By running such stories
high in the lineup, networks increase the profile of such parties. Because televi-
sual images are powerful, and have the potential to shape viewers’ attitudes and
behaviours, the significance of airtime cannot be underestimated. By allowing
leaders and candidates to be seen frequently in the living rooms of the nation, the
networks are facilitating the campaigns of the front-runners.
Airtime and lineup bias appear to be directly related to polls that might,
themselves, play a gatekeeping function. Increased coverage of the Conservative
party followed the increased popularity of that party, as indicated by polls. As
such, polls themselves might be specifically added to Shoemaker and Reese’s
(1996) list of the factors associated with media gatekeeping. Certainly, in the case
of the 2006 Canadian election, as public support for a party grew, network inter-
est in covering that party appeared to grow as well.
However, polls are not always accurate (Marzolini, 2006). This was certainly
the case during the 2004 federal election. Media coverage might influence polls,
or the reverse might occur, probably a combination of both. However, if news-
room lineups are influenced by poll results, as they appear to be, polls have a lot
of power. Because of such polls, garnering coverage is an ongoing challenge for
smaller parties. The data indicate the Liberals and Conservatives, as front-run-
ners, received the lion’s share of the coverage. The NDP received more coverage
than the Bloc Québécois and the Green party. Again, for the most part network
coverage was generally proportionate to the proportion of the vote predicted by
polls. Although the networks attempted to give a voice to smaller parties, and
CBC and CTV were particularly diligent in this regard, for the most part all net-
works treated this election as the two-party race it proved to be.
As a result, while focusing on both gatekeeping and coverage bias as defined
by D’Alessio and Allen (2000), I suggest that the definitions of bias should be
broadened. Future research might usefully assess statement bias, which moves
beyond volume of coverage and offers an ambitious assessment of the favoura-
bility of coverage media give each party. Secondly, further research exploring the
relationship between polls and volume of media coverage might offer further
insight into this important area. In addition, previous research has often ignored
the primacy of the pictures themselves on television. More attention might be
paid to how candidates are portrayed visually, expanding research beyond the
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content of sound bites and the issues addressed in television news reports to
visual representation. Finally, future research, undertaken by the author, will
address both how local stations cover Canadian provincial elections and whether
coverage of the federal election of 2008 differed from coverage in 2006.
I conclude by acknowledging that it is difficult for relatively small parties to
garner the coverage they need to increase support. Because, as mentioned, the lit-
erature shows a relationship between amount of coverage and voter support, this
is an important finding. With this in mind, networks might usefully consider
increasing their efforts to give more coverage to smaller parties.
Granted, this is easier said than done. As an academic who has also spent
many years as a network producer, I recognize the difficulty of giving airtime to
smaller parties. There is more public interest in front-runners than in smaller par-
ties. In the 2006 election, it was evident that the “race” was between the Liberals
and the Conservatives who were to dethrone them. It is easy to call for more cov-
erage of smaller parties but producers, who are gauging public interest at daily
story meetings, can make the case that they best serve their audiences by focus-
ing on the perceived big story of the day: the competition between the Liberals
and Conservatives. It also follows that the many voters who were gearing up to
cast their votes for one of these two parties would expect to see related stories at
the top of the lineup. However, networks that address airtime and lineup bias and
choose to give more profile to smaller parties might consider what a difference
even small steps in that direction might make to the democratic process.
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Appendix A
Weekly Breakdown of Table 1: Overall party coverage and average
ranking in the lineup.
Week 1
Number of stories focusing on each party (and % of coverage that represents)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 7 (33.3) 6 (28.6) 4 (19.0) 3(14.3) 1 (4.8)
CTV 5 (29.4) 6 (35.3) 3 (17.6) 2(11.8) 1 (5.9)
Global 5 (31.3) 5 (31.3) 4 (25.0) 1 (6.3) 1 (6.3)
Average ranking in lineup
CBC 1 2 3 4 5
CTV 1 2 3 4 5
Global 2 1 3 4 4
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Week 2
Number of stories focusing on each party (and % of coverage that represents)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 3 (33.3) 3 (33.3) 3 (33.3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
CTV 4 (40.0) 5 (50.0) 1 (10.0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Global 3 (33.3) 4 (44.4) 2 (22.2) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Average ranking in lineup
CBC 2 1 3 N/A** N/A
CTV 2 1 3 N/A N/A
Global 2 1 3 N/A N/A
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
** N/A signifies that there were no stories focusing on the party, thus there is nothing to
rank in the lineup. 
Week 3
Number of stories focusing on each party (and % of coverage that represents)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 5 (31.3) 5 (31.3) 3 (18.7) 3(18.7) 0 (0)
CTV 5 (33.3) 6 (40) 3 (20) 1 (6.7) 0 (0)
Global 4 (40) 4 (40) 2 (20) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Average ranking in lineup
CBC 2 1 3 4 N/A**
CTV 2 1 3 4 N/A
Global 2 1 3 N/A N/A
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
** N/A signifies that there were no stories focusing on the party, thus there is nothing to
rank in the lineup. 
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Appendix B
Weekly Breakdown of Table 2: Number of times leaders and parties
were mentioned.
Week 1
Number of times leaders mentioned (and % of total)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 17 (33.3) 18 (35.3) 9 (17.6) 6(11.8) 1 (2.0)
CTV 15 (40.5) 11 (29.7) 7 (18.9) 3 (8.1) 1 (2.7)
Global 11 (35.5) 12 (38.7) 5 (16.1) 2 (6.5) 1 (3.2)
Number of times parties mentioned (and % of total)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 27 (39.7) 23 (33.8) 12 (17.6) 5 (7.4) 1 (1.5)
CTV 15 (34.9) 12 (27.9) 7 (16.3) 5(11.6) 4 (9.3)
Global 13 (38.2) 13 (38.2) 5 (14.7) 2 (5.9) 1 (2.9)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Week 2
Number of times leaders mentioned (and % of total)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 29 (31.9) 31 (34.1) 19 (20.9) 11(12.1) 1 (1.1)
CTV 18 (34.6) 21 (40.4) 8 (15.4) 5 (9.6) 0 (0)
Global 10 (34.5) 11 (37.9) 5 (17.2) 3(10.3) 0 (0)
Number of times parties mentioned (and % of total)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 39 (33.9) 37 (32.2) 25 (21.7) 14(12.2) 2 (1.7)
CTV 23 (36.5) 20 (31.7) 9 (14.3) 9(14.3) 2 (3.2)
Global 12 (36.4) 14 (42.4) 5 (15.2) 2 (6.1) 0 (0)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Week 3
Number of times leaders mentioned (and % of total)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 15 (31.9) 19 (40.4) 9 (19.1) 4 (8.5) 0 (0)
CTV 14 (29.8) 23 (48.9) 8 (17) 2 (4.3) 0 (0)
Global 11 (42.3) 11 (42.3) 4 (15.4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Number of times parties mentioned (and % of total)*
Liberals Conservatives NDP Bloc Green
Québécois Party
CBC 28 (34.6) 31 (38.3) 15 (18.5) 7 (8.6) 0 (0)
CTV 22 (28.9) 26 (34.2) 16 (21.1) 6 (7.9) 6 (7.9)
Global 13 (38.2) 12 (35.3) 7 (20.6) 1 (2.9) 1 (2.9)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
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Appendix C
Weekly Breakdown of Table 3: Overall number of partisan clips and
percentage of total time leaders were given for their clips.
Week 1
Number of clips (and % of total number of clips allocated to leaders)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 18 (28.1) 26 (40.1) 11 (17.2) 6 (9.4) 3 (4.7)
CTV 14 (35.9) 16 (41.0) 4 (10.3) 3 (7.7) 2 (5.1)
Global 15 (44.1) 10 (29.4) 7 (20.6) 1 (2.9) 1 (2.9)
Total number of words each leader speaks in clips 
(and % of total words allocated to leaders)*
CBC 545 (30.8) 740 (41.8) 293 (16.5) 128 (7.2) 65 (3.7)
CTV 311 (36.2) 357 (41.6) 92 (10.7) 51 (5.9) 47 (5.5)
Global 408 (49.3) 239 (28.9) 132 (15.9) 25 (3.0) 23 (2.8)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Week 2
Number of clips (and % of total number of clips allocated to leaders)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 28 (33.7) 34 (41.0) 16 (19.3) 2 (2.4) 3 (3.6)
CTV 19 (38.0) 19 (38.0) 8 (16.0) 2 (4.0) 2 (4.0)
Global 5 (35.7) 7 (50.0) 1 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (7.1)
Total number of words each leader speaks in clips 
(and % of total words allocated to leaders)*
CBC 821 (41.4) 804 (40.5) 305 (15.4) 54 (2.7) 0 (0.0)
CTV 457 (40.5) 434 (38.4) 199 (17.6) 39 (3.5) 0 (0.0)
Global 130 (33.4) 223 (57.3) 36 (9.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
Week 3 
Number of clips (and % of total number of clips allocated to leaders)*
Paul Stephen Jack Gilles Jim
Martin Harper Layton Duceppe Harris
CBC 24 (36.4) 28 (42.4) 8 (12.1) 6 (9.1) 0 (0.0)
CTV 21 (42.9) 18 (36.7) 9 (18.4) 1 (2.0) 0 (0.0)
Global 12 (66.7) 13 (72.2) 5 (27.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total number of words each leader speaks in clips 
(and % of total words allocated to leaders)*
CBC 713 (38.7) 756 (41) 224 (12.2) 150 (8.1) 0 (0.0)
CTV 409 (40.5) 414 (41) 173 (17.1) 14 (1.4) 0 (0.0)
Global 388 (42.2) 446 (48.5) 86 (9.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
* Columns may not add up to precisely 100% due to rounding up or down to one decimal point.
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